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I. INTRODUCTION
THE GOVERNMENT contractor defense was recog-
nized and adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in 1988 in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 1 Since
that time, the government contractor defense, also re-
ferred to as the Boyle defense, has become a versatile
shield against liability employed by government contrac-
tors defending a wide range of tort lawsuits. Federal
courts, otherwise faced with increasingly crowded dock-
ets, have readily applied the Boyle defense in dismissing
large numbers of tort-based lawsuits at the summary judg-
ment stage. The Boyle defense has become a major im-
pediment to the plaintiffs bar in the field of aviation
litigation, and lawyers have expended serious efforts at-
tempting to punch a hole through this legal shield re-
cently brandished with impunity by manufacturing
defendants.
The Boyle case itself has been much maligned by those
who disagree with its outcome,2 misunderstood by those
with no experience with the government procurement
1 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
2 "[T]he majority's decision to carve out a new area of uniquely federal interest
and then displace state law for no better reason than to prevent what it perceives
to be a potential prejudicial impact upon the federal treasury is unprecedented,
shocking, and an unabashed act of judicial law-making." 1 LEE S. KREINDLER,
AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 7-90 (1993).
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process,3 and factually distorted by writers who know little
about the underlying facts of the case. The following arti-
cle is intended to clear up some of these misconceptions.
More important, however, the article is meant to act as a
guide to government contractors and manufacturers when
faced with tort litigation in the future.4
This article is broken down into five major substantive
sections. The first section provides the reader with a be-
hind-the-scenes perspective of the Boyle case itself. This
section recounts the circumstances surrounding the crash
and details the resulting litigation from the perspective of
eyewitnesses and participants.
The second section illustrates the Boyle defense in ac-
tion. This section explains the three-part test that makes
up the government contractor defense and lists examples
of how federal courts have applied and interpreted each
leg of the defense.
The third section provides a list of tactics used by plain-
tiffs in their first assault on the government contractor de-
fense. This section not only provides examples of various
strategies for attacking the government contractor de-
fense, but also details a defendant's response to each.
The fourth section is intended as a guide for military
contractors and their in-house legal departments on how
best to prepare for the future and preserve their govern-
ment contractor defenses. This section lists several rec-
ommendations which, if followed, could substantially
increase the chances of a successful Boyle defense and re-
duce future liability exposure for manufacturers. These
5 As illustrated by such claims as "[m]anufacturer liability would promote re-
calls .... " WINDLE TURLEY, AVIATION LITIGATION 78 (1986). Imagine the head-
lines "Gulf War Called Off. Chrysler Recalls M- I Tanks for Defective Gas Tank
Placement." The same author makes the unsupported statement that "[pilacing
the risk of loss on the victim ultimately places the cost on the government in the
form of welfare dependency .... " Id.
4 This article is written from the manufacturer's perspective. Several outstand-
ing articles have preceded this one written unmistakably from the opposite per-
spective. Although the author did not participate in the Boyle case, he has been
involved in litigation involving Sikorsky products, including defending Sikorsky in
CH-53D litigation with issues strikingly similar to those in Boyle.
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recommendations could also provide defense counsel
with valuable support in defending future government
contractor cases.
The final substantive section provides predictions for
the future of the government contractor defense and pos-
sible areas of expansion for this powerful litigation tool.
While some may hope that the government contractor de-
fense has already enjoyed its heyday, the future for the
Boyle defense and related legal theories may be bright
indeed.
II. LIFE AND LITIGATION - GAMES OF CHANCE
Ultimately, the Boyle case was a tremendous victory for
the defendant, United Technologies Corporation (Sikor-
sky Aircraft Division) and all manufacturers who provide
products to the military. Nonetheless, the Boyle case re-
mains a bitter memory for many of the Sikorsky employ-
ees involved in the trial.
History cannot be changed. Unquestionably, the jury
found that an unreasonably dangerous design defect ex-
isted in the helicopter that caused a serviceman's death.5
From a strictly legal sense, the facts are as the jury finds
them. Very little cynicism, however, is required to admit
that whether a design is found defective depends on a
number of factors totally unrelated to the design itself,
such as the skill and presentation of the lawyers, the sym-
pathy factor of the case, and the intelligence, political ori-
entation, and prejudice of the jury.
Every writer who discusses the government contractor
defense accepts as truth the facts as found by the Boyle
jury.6 What follows is the author's presumptuous judg-
I Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986),judg-
ment vacated by 487 U.S. 500 (1988), on remand to 857 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988).
6 Ernie Stewart, Comment, The Government Made Me Do It.: Has Boyle v. United
Technologies Extended the Government Contract Defense Too Far?, 57 J. AIR L. & COM.
981, 987 (1992). "[Boyle] drowned when he could not escape from the helicop-
ter. Boyle and his men were trapped inside the helicopter because the escape
hatch, which opened outward rather than inward as required by government spec-
[59
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ment notwithstanding the verdict. What really happened
to Lieutenant Boyle will never be known with certainty.
The circumstances surrounding the accident, however,
cast considerable doubt on the judgment that the jury,
history, and subsequent writers have passed on the design
of the Sikorsky helicopter involved.
A. CAPTAIN TUSSING ROLLS THE DICE
Captain Tussing rubbed his eyes and focused on the
alarm clock. 0215 hours . . . the beginning of another
glamorous day for a helicopter pilot in the United States
Marine Corps. He rolled out of bed, put on his flight suit
and headed for the 0245 briefing on the day's operations.7
Captain Tussing would act as the pilot-in-command of a
Marine Corps CH-53D, identified by its bureau number
(BUNO) 157151.8 The crew manifest for BUNO 157151
that morning, April 27, 1983, listed the copilot as First
Lieutenant David A. Boyle and the crew chief as Sergeant
Charles F. Tubbs. 9 Lance Corporal Jerry D. Trickett
would ride along as a passenger in the gunner seat.' 0
ifications, was pinned by increasing water pressure as the helicopter sank." Id.
"[T]he helicopter co-pilot died not as a result of the crash of the helicopter into
the Atlantic Ocean but rather because the hatch on his helicopter was not
designed to open inward. Instead the hatch only opened outward, the co-pilot
could not open the hatch against the water pressure, and the co-pilot drowned."
Peter W. Hohenhaus, Purpose and Policy - Further Development to the Federal Govern-
ment Contractor's Defense Following Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, 1981
WL 330766, at *4-5 (May 1991). "Although Boyle survived the impact, he
drowned [because] . . .the escape hatch . . .open[ed] outward . . . [and] [t]he
water pressure exerted on the helicopter made it impossible to open the hatch
outward." 3 LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 31.02[3][b] (1993).
7 Manual ofJudge Advocate General, Final Investigative Report, Enclosure 4 [here-
inafterJAG Report] (on file with author). "JAG reports" are investigative reports
conducted by the Department of the Navy and are generally available upon re-
quest through the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1992).
8 BUNO 157151 was referred to by the crew as "O1' Number Seven." Bert B.
Tussing, My Time, APPROACH (Commander, Naval Safety Ctr., Norfolk, Va.) Nov.
1984, at 3. "She had been a perennial 'stable queen' among the Sea Stallions. In
recent memory, Old Seven had always been the one .. .we really had to stroke
before any major operation." Id.
9 JAG Report, supra note 7, Findings of Fact 5.
10 Referred to by the Marine Corps as an "authorized passenger." Id., Findings
of Fact 5-6.
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They were all part of HMH-461, a Marine helicopter
squadron taking part in Operation Solid Shield 8311 while
stationed on board the USS Nassau, then cruising just off
the Virginia coast. 12
Captain Tussing had preflighted the aircraft the previ-
ous afternoon, carefully looking over the helicopter that
was almost as old as his copilot. It is easier to preflight in
the daylight, and no right-thinking pilot would relish get-
ting up before 2:15 a.m. to conduct a preflight. 13 Two dis-
crepancies with the aircraft came to Captain Tussing's
attention during the preflight. First, he noted that the
flight ready light was listed in the aircraft log book as in-
termittent. 14 The flight ready light provides the crew with
a single source warning light that, when illuminated, indi-
cates the rotor system is locked and ready for flight prior
to departure. When the light extinguishes, the crew's cu-
riosity is necessarily piqued as they try to determine from
other sources if the main rotors are ready for flight. 15
Captain Tussing discussed this write-up with Sergeant
Tubbs, who felt that the light was intermittent due to a
faulty wiring harness since no other system problems
were noted. Sergeant Tubbs was confident that the inter-
mittent light would in no way jeopardize the safety of
flight.' 6 To compensate for the intermittent light, Ser-
geant Tubbs would visibly inspect certain rotor compo-
nents prior to each launch to insure the systems were
operating correctly. 17
1 ".. . a rehearsal exercise for one of those huge interservice efforts." Tussing,
supra note 8, at 3.
12 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 22.
13 Id., Enclosure 4; Tussing, supra note 8, at 3.
14 Id.
11 NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL, RH-53D HELICOPrER, U.S. NAVY 1-95 (1975)
[hereinafter NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL] (on file with the Journal of Air Law &
Commerce).
16 "I've always been less than anxious to fly a bird whose caution lights are
waving the not-safe-for-flight banner in my eyes. [Quality Assurance] joined in
the 'but it's still safe to fly' chorus, and I finally succumbed." Tussing, supra note
8, at 3.
'7 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4. It was later demonstrated at the trial
arising from this crash that the flight crew did not understand the helicopter rotor
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The second write-up regarding BUNO 157151 involved
the flight controls. The log book indicated that when the
pilot's cyclic' 8 was centered, the copilot's cyclic was
canted slightly left of center.' 9 Sergeant Tubbs felt that
the problem was only a matter of positioning and that the
cyclic control movements would not be inhibited.20  If
Sergeant Tubbs was wrong, the crew would be unable to
utilize the full left cyclic travel if placed in a situation war-
ranting such a severe maneuver.2 '
Captain Tussing could have refused the aircraft for
either the intermittent flight ready light or the problem
with the cyclic positioning.22  Every military pilot con-
system sufficiently to have determined if the rotor system was locked and ready for
flight. Telephone interview with Jack Carson (Jan. 18, 1994).
18 A helicopter is controlled by three primary flight controls. The "collective"
is a control stick located just outside of the pilot's left leg. When the collective is
in the full down position, the main rotor blades are in the flat pitch position,
thereby producing no thrust. As the collective is raised by the pilot's left arm, the
pitch of the main rotor blades throughout the entire rotor tip path plane is in-
creased, thereby increasing thrust. The term "collective" is simply shorthand for
collective pitch control. In simple terms the collective makes the aircraft go up
and down. The "cyclic," on the other hand, directs the aircraft left, right, for-
ward, or backward. The cyclic is a control stick located between the pilot's legs.
Whereas the collective changes the pitch in the entire main rotor tip path plane,
the cyclic alters the pitch in a select portion of the main rotor tip path plane. The
net effect is that the tip path plane of the main rotor blades is tilted in the direc-
tion that the pilot points the cyclic. The third flight control consists of the anti-
torque pedals controlled by the pilot's feet. As the pilot increases the collective
pitch on the main rotor system, the helicopter's fuselage experiences torque in the
opposite direction of the main rotor rotation. In a single main rotor configura-
tion, a helicopter would spin in the opposite direction of the main rotors because
of this phenomenon. Helicopter designers compensate for this by placing a tail
rotor at the rear of the aircraft fuselage which provides thrust in the opposite
direction of the torque moment. The pitch of the tail rotor is controlled by left
and right foot inputs by the pilot on the anti-torque pedals. FUNDAMENTALS OF
FLIGHT, FLIGHT MANUAL 1-203, U.S. ARMY 1-42 to 1-44, 3-35 to 3-399 (1983)
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OF FLIGHT] (on file with the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce).
19 "[P]reflight bore it out: The copilot's cyclic was out of alignment. When the
flight controls were neutralized, the pilot's stick was standing up straight and
pretty, just like all good cyclics were raised to do, but the copilot's canted slightly
to the left." Tussing, supra note 8, at 3.
20 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4.
21 Telephone interviews with Jack Carson, Test Pilot, Sikorsky Aircraft Division
(Aug. 6, 1993 and Jan. 18, 1994).
22 Id. In fact, the crew should not have accepted the aircraft for flight. Both the
intermittent flight ready light and cyclic rigging discrepancies are grounding con-
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stantly balances safety considerations against mission ac-
complishment. Marine Corps pilots have flown with
significantly worse problems on numerous occasions with-
out a glitch. It was a judgment call; it was Captain Tus-
sing's call, and he decided to roll the dice.23
BUNO 157151 launched as part of a three-aircraft flight
at 0420 hours. 4 The large combat assault helicopters
looked like green buses taking flight into the dark Atlantic
sky. 25
The aircraft flew like a champ and was recovered from
the morning's launch at 0751. The crews were debriefed,
had breakfast, and then re-briefed for a second flight.
Captain Tussing and Lt. Boyle launched the aircraft for a
second time that morning in a flight of four CH-53s at
ditions. The aircraft was not in a flyable condition and should never have de-
parted. Id. In his defense, Captain Tussing wrote "Before you Lazyboy
quarterbacks deposit your Delta Sierra ballots for yours truly . . . the call was
good. The aircraft, from all that could be determined, was safe for flight .
Tussing, supra note 8, at 3.
23 "[Quality Assurance] joined in on the refrain, and I surrendered, satisfied...
with a reasonable explanation." Tussing, supra note 8, at 4. While Captain Tus-
sing may have believed it was a judgment call, in fact the aircraft did not meet
Marine Corps criteria for flightworthiness and should have been grounded by the
Unit Maintenance Officer or any pilot that reviewed the aircraft's logs for either
the intermittent flight ready light or cyclic rigging discrepancies. The Sikorsky
trial team, when conducting investigations relating to the subsequent litigation
arising out of this accident, also determined that a hydraulic fluid sample taken by
the Unit's maintenance department was known to have been contaminated prior
to the flight in question. The Unit's maintenance department, therefore, should
have grounded the aircraft for this discrepancy as well. Telephone interview with
Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Jan. 18, 1994). A fourth problem with the aircraft
should also have resulted in a grounding condition. While running up the aircraft
for the second morning's mission, Captain Tussing noted a problem with the No.
2 engine's low side torque readings. JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4. This
discrepancy with the engine instruments was sufficient to have justified declining
the aircraft and scrubbing the mission. Telephone interview with Jack Carson,
supra note 21 (Jan. 18, 1994). In summary, there were four independent reasons
why the aircraft in question should not have departed on the morning of April 27,
1983. The aircraft simply was not flightworthy. Id.
24 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4.
25 The helicopter's fuselage is boxcar shaped, almost nine feet wide, and over
67 feet long from nose to tail. NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1-4.
The aircraft's design gross weight is 42,000 pounds and normally seats 37 passen-
gers. Id. at 1-3.
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1120 hours. 26 BUNO 157151 cleared the deck of the USS
Nassau and proceeded with the other helicopters to the
USS Inchon for simulated troop pickup landings. It was a
clear day with high scattered clouds and a moderate
breeze out of the south." Later in the afternoon, the USS
Shreveport requested that two of the CH-53s come to her
decks for practice landings. BUNO 157151 and one other
CH-53D were cut loose from the flight of four and pro-
ceeded toward the Shreveport. 8
Lt. Boyle was piloting the aircraft from the left seat as
they approached the Shreveport. Lt. Boyle was a brand-
new pilot in the squadron. He was low time in the CH-
53D, but had been an above average student at flight
school. He was well-liked, confident, and an excellent
swimmer.2 9 His attention was momentarily drawn to an F-
14 flying nearby, and Captain Tussing admonished him to
expedite his*approach. After being cleared to land,
BUNO 157151 lined up behind the other CH-53D, which
was approaching the landing spot in front of BUNO
157151's intended touchdown a0
Captain Tussing noticed the aircraft in front of them
begin to slow down for approach too soon. They would
probably have to take their aircraft around to prevent
rushing the lead aircraft."' Lt. Boyle was having trouble
with the approach angle, and Captain Tussing continued
to offer constructive criticism and admonishment.3 2 He
started to get that uneasy feeling that something wasn't
quite right. They were getting very low, very slow, and
26 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4.
27 Id., Findings of Fact 2.
28 Id., Enclosure 4.
Id. Although recognized as competent, Captain Tussing was considered a
below-average pilot in his unit. Id., Enclosure 20. A common trend in CH-53
military helicopter accidents involves below-average aircraft commanders flying
with aggressive and talented young co-pilots. Telephone interview with Jack Car-
son, supra note 21 (Jan. 18, 1994).
30 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4.
21 Id.
32 "Capt[ain] Tussing was instructing Lt. Boyle all the time that he was trying to
land. Lt. Boyle's approach was bad so we were waved off to try again." Id., Enclo-
sure 6.
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very close to the water. 3
Lt. Boyle announced "I am going to wave it off," and he
broadcast his intentions to the Shreveport. Captain Tus-
sing took the controls and began to initiate the right turn
to set up another approach. Lt. Boyle, apparently not yet
having relinquished the controls, shouted "I can't get
enough left cyclic!" 34 These were the last words anyone
would hear from the newest pilot in the squadron.
The aircraft continued to turn to the right. Captain
Tussing attempted to arrest the roll with left cyclic input
to no avail. The aircraft settled into the water on its right
side, slightly nose-down. 5
Captain Tussing immediately began screaming for the
crew to egress the aircraft. He reached for the pilot's win-
dow emergency release and saw about four inches of light
between the top of the window and the water. He pushed
the window out and released his harness as the aircraft
cockpit began rolling to the right. He would have to swim
down and out from under the wreckage. 6
The time seemed like an eternity, but it must have been
only one or two seconds before Tussing finally broke to
the surface. Then he was sucked back into the ocean by
the water rushing into the empty cabin and cargo com-
partments. He fought his way back to the surface after a
time period that seemed even longer than the first.
37
Splashing around in the water, he saw Lance Corporal
Trickett on top of part of the aircraft that was sticking out
of the water.3 8 Sergeant Tubbs was trying to climb on the
33 Id., Enclosure 4; Tussing, supra note 8, at 4.
34 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4. This statement supports the theory
that Lt. Boyle was attempting to make a left turn while Captain Tussing was trying
to make a right turn. Telephone interview with Ron Bowles, Deputy Counsel,
Sikorsky Aircraft Division (Feb. 11, 1994).
3- JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4. The touchdown was relatively gentle,
as demonstrated by Sgt. Tubbs's trial testimony that he was standing in the heli-
copter's cargo compartment prior to impact and was not knocked off his feet by
the impact. Telephone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (Feb. 11, 1994).
36 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4; Tussing, supra note 8, at 5.
37 Id.
38 Id. The depth at the crash site was less than fifteen feet. The aircraft had
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aircraft's sponson tanks. Captain Tussing began to yell
for Lt. Boyle and to splash about frantically looking for
him.s9 He never surfaced. 40  Lady Luck would smile on
only three of the four crew members that day.
B. CARSON'S SURE BET
"Jack, the jury came back for the plaintiff.".
Jack Carson was stunned. The confidence and pride he
felt as the chief pilot witness for Sikorsky Aircraft
vaporized into a feeling of sickening bewilderment. The
plaintiff had no case. Everybody knew it, including the
plaintiffs attorney. Everybody ... except the jury.
The plaintiff was the father of Lt. David A. Boyle, the
Marine helicopter pilot who drowned when his CH-53D
helicopter crashed into the ocean off the coast of Vir-
ginia.42 Jack Carson, a former Marine pilot and a Sikorsky
test pilot for the CH-53 program, was appalled that the
case had ever been brought to trial. There was no evi-
dence that any component of the aircraft failed prior to
the crash or that any defect caused Lt. Boyle's death.43
rolled upside down leaving the flat belly exposed about two feet above the water
line. Telephone interview with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
59 JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4. "It didn't make sense to me .. . [Mly
side of the aircraft was the one that impacted the heaviest; the roll was in my
direction; where the hell was he?" Tussing, supra note 8, at 5.
40 His body was recovered later that day by divers who found him tangled in
nylon straps in the passenger compartment. JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure
14. The cause of death was later determined as drowning. Id., Findings of Fact
17. There was no evidence that he was rendered unconscious or otherwise in-
jured during the crash sequence. Id., Enclosure 24. There was some evidence
that he had clawed at the compartment's interior while drowning. Telephone in-
terview with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
41 Telephone interview with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993). Mr.
Carson was not actually present when the jury verdict was returned. He recalls
receiving a telephone call after dinner in his hotel room informing him of the
verdict. Id.
42 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502 (1988).
43 An engineering investigation performed by the Navy determined that the air-
craft had hydraulic contamination in all flight control servos. Such contamination
was attributable to hydraulic servicing by squadron maintenance personnel. A
Navy investigation of the accident noted that the squadron had not followed
proper hydraulic fluid sampling procedures, but did not attribute the accident to
this. A metallic chip was found on one of the automatic flight control system's
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The pilots allowed the aircraft to get too low and slow and
simply flew the aircraft into the ocean.4 4
The plaintiff had shifted gears in the middle of trial and
focused on a design defect theory directed at the emer-
gency exits. 45 It was evident that Lt. Boyle had survived
the initial impact with the water and died from drown-
ing.46 His first line of egress was the copilot's emergency
window exit located at his left shoulder as he sat in the
cockpit. The copilot's window swings outward much like
a car door, but the emergency window exit is actually an
escape hatch comprised of the window and its frame
which fall away from the helicopter when activated. 47 Lt.
Boyle's body was found in the cargo area of the helicopter
unbuckled from his seat belt. From this fact, the plaintiff
servo valves. The Navy investigator noted that this metallic chip would have been
sufficient to jam the valve and cause a cyclic stick drive to the right. Although
there was little evidence that this caused the crash, the Navy investigation team
concluded that it was the most probable cause of a reported flight control prob-
lem. JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 36. The Sikorsky accident investigation
team concluded that the Navy's probable cause finding was insupportable and in-
correct. Sikorsky did not adopt the Navy's conclusion at trial, despite the fact that
the metallic chip contamination would have been introduced into the system by
the Navy. Telephone interview with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
44 After participating in an investigation of the crash and the trial presentation
for Sikorsky, and after listening to a majority of the testimony in the Boyle case,
Jack Carson concluded that one of the two pilots had initiated an aggressive but-
ton-hook turn close to the water on wave off during approach. The copilot's cyclic
stick was reported to be two to three inches out-of-rig to the left. This may have
limited the crew's ability to induce sufficient left cyclic input to level the aircraft.
Sikorsky attributed the cause of the accident to pilot error. Telephone interview
with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
43 The plaintiff initially adopted the Navy's theory of the cause of the accident.
Plaintiff's expert testified that a metallic particle had jammed one of the automatic
flight control system hydraulic switches and caused the aircraft to bank uncontrol-
lably to the right. There was overwhelming evidence that the metallic particle
could only have been introduced into the aircraft's hydraulic system by Marine
Corps maintenance activities. This theory of plaintiffs case became unattractive
when plaintiffs engineering expert witness admitted to the jury that the design of
the hydraulic flight control system by Sikorsky was sound. Telephone interview
with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
46 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
47 NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1-64. Navy design criteria man-
dates that all aircraft escape hatches open outward in order to ensure uniform
design and allow for easy extraction of crews by ground rescue personnel. Tele-
phone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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concluded that Lt. Boyle had been unable to open his exit
and had attempted to depart the sinking aircraft through
the rear cargo area. The plaintiff argued that the copilot's
exit should have been designed to open inward rather
than outward, thereby precluding the possibility that
water pressure outside a sinking aircraft would impede
the crew in their efforts to open it.481
Jack Carson was in disbelief when he first heard this
preposterous theory. From a practical standpoint, there
simply is not any room in the cockpit of a helicopter for
the pilot exit to open inward. There are several objects
inside the cockpit that would restrict such movement, not
the least of which were the pilot's seat, the aircraft con-
trols, and the pilot himself. Besides, the plaintiff's theory
was not supported by history. Pilots had been opening
crew exits outward in water accidents for years.49 In fact,
Lt. Boyle was the only member of the four-man crew who
was unable to escape drowning. 50 The pilot seemed to
have no difficulty in opening his door on the opposite side
of the aircraft.5'
Most damning of all to the plaintiff's theory, however,
was the conclusive evidence that Lt. Boyle never at-
tempted to open his emergency exit. The CH-53 was
designed with an emergency exit release mechanism acti-
vated by a handle next to the pilot's left hand. Pulling the
handle not only opens the exit, but loosens it from all of
its hinges. The exit hatch then simply drops away after
being pushed out by the crew member.52 In order to pro-
48 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503.
49 Jack Carson thought the theory was "stupid.". The Navy and Marine Corps
had never experienced problems with the design of the exit after almost twenty
years of CH-53 operations. Jack Carson knew a personal friend who had used the
same exit when exiting a sinking CH-53 in Vietnam. Telephone interview with
Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
5 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986).
5' JAG Report, supra note 7, Enclosure 4. "There was no reason for him to-have
remained in that helicopter. Mine was the side that had impacted. If anyone over-
head had wanted to guess whose was the helmet bobbing among the wreckage,
the safe bet would have been mine." Tussing, supra note 8, at 5.
52 NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1-64.
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vide a visual check for inadvertent activation of this jetti-
son feature, the release handle is secured with a thin
safety wire designed to show that the handle is in the
locked position until a small amount of force is applied to
the handle by the pilot, thereby breaking the safety wire.53
After the aircraft was recovered, investigators found
that the safety wire on Lt. Boyle's door was still intact.5 4
As far as Jack Carson was concerned, Lt. Boyle never at-
tempted to escape through his own emergency exit.
Dazed and perhaps confused from the impact and the
gushing water that was pouring into the cockpit, Lt. Boyle
had unstrapped himself and become disoriented inside
the large helicopter's fuselage,55 which is about the size of
a Greyhound bus.56
The Sikorsky trial team felt confident at the end of their
case. The CH-53D had long been touted as the best
designed, best built, most dependable helicopter in the
world. The lawyers had done their job, and the Sikorsky
witnesses had defended their product. The plaintiff's set-
tlement demand at the close of Sikorsky's case was so low
as to merit some consideration despite the feeling by eve-
ryone involved that the jury would return a verdict for
defendant.
Jack Carson listened to the members of the trial team,
including the trial attorneys, corporate attorney, accident
investigator, and a representative from the insurance car-
rier, the day before the verdict as they discussed the plain-
tiff's low-ball demand. Jack, like everyone present, was
51 Telephone interview with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
51 Tussing, supra note 8, at 5. "His window was still closed; the emergency re-
lease handle still shear-wired in place, untouched." Id.
15 Id. Although Lt. Boyle received water egress training in flight school, he had
not undergone such training in the CH-53. Lt. Boyle's new unit should have ad-
ministered the training to him prior to flying over-water missions in this aircraft.
Telephone interview with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Jan. 18, 1994). There was
also compelling evidence that Lt. Boyle purposely entered the helicopter's cargo
area in order to check on the two Marines (Sgt. Tubbs and Corp. Trickett) in the
back. Telephone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (Feb. 11, 1994).
56 NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1-4.
51 Telephone interview with Jack Carson, supra note 21 (Aug. 6, 1993).
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confident. This was a sure bet. The team had come this
far and done its best, and there was no longer any ration-
ale for a nuisance value settlement. An informal poll was
taken. One by one, everyone on the Sikorsky team en-
dorsed the rejection of the plaintiffs last demand. 58
The sure bet went south. Jack Carson felt physically ill.
Shock turned to disgust, disgust to anger. To him, the
jury had just announced that Sikorsky killed Lt. Boyle. It
was a victory of passion over reason.59
C. A LONG SHOT NAMED DIXON
Although an affirmative defense called the "military
contractor defense" had been recognized in various forms
in a few courts, the defense strategy at the Boyle trial con-
centrated on the plaintiffs tenuous liability theory.6 °
Hammering away at the weaknesses in the plaintiffs case
and meeting the liability theories head-on seemed a more
prudent course than hiding behind an affirmative defense.
As an alternative ground for the jury to find for defend-
ants, however, the defense team covered their bets and
offered evidence in support of a military contractor
defense. 61
The prevalent understanding of the defense at the time
of trial was that a military contractor would be immune
from state tort liability for design defects if the contractor
could prove that:
(1) the United States is immune from liability; (2) the
United States approved reasonably precise specifications
for the equipment; (3) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (4) the supplier warned the United
58 Id.
59 Id. Jack Carson took the trial defeat personally and admitted to being "devas-
tated." To this day he recalls the trial as a bitter and disappointing experience.
Id.
60 See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448-50 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F.
Supp. 1046, 1053-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
61 Telephone interview with Tom Dixon, Director of Product Safety, Sikorsky
Aircraft Division (Oct. 29, 1993).
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States about dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.6"
In order to prove these elements, Sikorsky presented a
single witness, a Sikorsky engineer named Thomas
Dixon.63
Thomas Dixon was a knowledgeable company man. He
had started with Sikorsky in 1951 as an engineer and later
supervised much of the design work on the rotors and
flight control systems for the CH-53 helicopter. He had
been the Engineering Manager for the entire CH-53 pro-
gram in the mid-seventies, and was Sikorsky's Director of
Product Safety at the time of trial. Mr. Dixon was a gen-
eral utility witness for the government contractor defense,
having knowledge about many aspects of the govern-
ment's involvement in the design and manufacture of the
CH-53 helicopter.64
At trial Mr. Dixon described the back and forth discus-
sions between Sikorsky and the Navy regarding the design
of the CH-53 helicopter. He testified that the Navy was
involved in every step of the complex process of develop-
ing a military helicopter from initial design conception to
final aircraft production. He specifically testified about a
mock-up of the cockpit built by Sikorsky that was reviewed
and approved by the United States Navy. This mock-up
revealed the exact design that the Boyle plaintiff com-
plained was defective. 65 Tom Dixon was Sikorsky's proof
that it had established as a matter of law the government
contractor defense. His testimony was not the focus of
the battle at the trial level, but it was Sikorsky's best hope
on appeal.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the trial record and made
the long shot a winner. Regarding the testimony of Tom
62 Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414; see also Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); Schoenborn v. Boeing Co., 769 F.2d 115
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
63 Telephone interview with Tom Dixon, supra note 61 (Oct. 29, 1993).
4 Id.
65 Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
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Dixon, the court stated that it had "previously said that
this type of exchange of information will normally suffice
to establish government approval of the design in ques-
tion."' 66 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Sikorsky had
satisfied the requirements of the military contractor de-
fense and could not be held liable for any design defect
alleged by the plaintiff.6 7 Now it was the plaintiff's turn to
appeal.
D. A JACKPOT FOR MR. BOWLES
At the time of the Boyle appeal, the government contrac-
tor defense was interpreted and applied in a hodgepodge
fashion by several state and federal courts.68 Because of
different rationales advanced for the defense and different
elements required to prove the defense, the United States
Supreme Court found ample reason to clarify this essen-
tially federal common law issue. 69 The Boyle case just hap-
pened to be the right case at the right time.
Ron Bowles 70 certainly believed that this was the right
case and the right time. As in-house counsel for Sikorsky,
he was highly cognizant of the possible benefits a govern-
ment contractor defense recognized by the Supreme
Court could provide by reducing litigation liability for his
66 Id.
67 Id. at 415.
6 See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11 th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., .704 F.2d 444
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (holding that the military con-
tractor defense eliminates all liability under § 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts); Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d
43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), affd, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977). For a history of the development of the government contractor defense, see
Stewart, supra note 6, at 982-99; see also 1 KREINDLER, supra note 2, § 7.05.
0 See TURLEY, supra note 3, at 75-79, which accurately predicted the Supreme
Court review of the military contractor defense two years before the Boyle deci-
sion. "The issue appears ripe for Supreme Court review in the near future." Id. at
77.
70 William R. Bowles, Deputy Counsel, Sikorsky Aircraft Division,J.D., St. Louis
University, 1969; L.L.M. Aviation Law, Southern Methodist University, 1976.
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company.7' He had initiated the efforts to introduce evi-
dence of government involvement in the design of the
CH-53 into the Boyle trial and personally selected Tom
Dixon for the task. 2
While he too was surprised by the jury verdict, Mr.
Bowles recognized that an appeal of this case to the
Fourth Circuit might be the opportunity military contrac-
tors had waited for.73 The only theory of recovery left
available to the plaintiffs was a simple, straight forward
design defect case relating to the emergency exits. 74 The
issue before the Fourth Circuit (and later the Supreme
Court) would be black and white. Would Sikorsky be held
liable under state tort law for the government-mandated
design features of a military combat helicopter or not?75
This was a risk worth taking. Mr. Bowles was dead set
against settlement or compromise. He strongly advo-
cated appeal to the Fourth Circuit.76
When the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court, Mr.
Bowles felt elated. Sikorsky had been vindicated. Then,
to his surprise and delight, the plaintiff applied for writ to
the Supreme Court. He relished the idea of presenting
this case to the highest court. The case was tailor-made
71 Telephone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (Jan. 31, 1994). Mr.
Bowles's interest in the military contractor defense began with a California state
court case, McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983).
72 Telephone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (Jan. 31, 1994).
71 Telephone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (May 18, 1993). In fact,
he was "shocked" by the jury's verdict, which he attributes to the impassioned
testimony of Lt. Boyle's family. Id.
74 Brief for Respondent at 8, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 92 F.2d 413
(4th Cir. 1986). Although the plaintiff argued that the helicopter's automatic
flight control system was defective, this issue was not submitted to the jury, and,
therefore, was not at issue on appeal. Id.
75 Sikorsky's position on appeal was supported by amici curiae briefs submitted
by the United States, National Security Industrial Association, Aerospace Industry
Association, American Gear Manufacturers Association, Electronic Industries As-
sociation, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, National Association of
Manufacturers, Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and numerous
manufacturers. A brief in support of the Boyle petition was filed by the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America.
76 Telephone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (Jan. 31, 1994).
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for a defense victory. In fact, if the Supreme Court up-
held the Fourth Circuit, a huge victory would result for
Sikorsky and military contractors.77
The Boyle plaintiff was granted certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court where he contended that in the ab-
sence of legislation specifically immunizing government
contractors from liability for design defects there was no
basis for the judicial recognition of the government con-
tractor defense. 78 The Supreme Court disagreed, and in-
stead announced a three-part test, destined thereafter to
be coined the "Boyle Test," providing:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot
be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the
supplier warned the United States about the dangers in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier
but not to the United States.79
The Supreme Court adopted this test after concluding
that to do otherwise would frustrate the "discretionary
function" exercised by the United States government
when balancing the many technical, military, and even so-
cial considerations involved in procuring military equip-
ment. The Court noted that this discretionary function
often involves a trade-off between greater safety and
greater combat effectiveness.8 0
Since the recognition of the government contractor de-
fense in Boyle, numerous government contractors have
routinely been granted summary judgment upon a show-
ing that the elements of the Boyle test were satisfied.8"
77 Telephone interviews with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (May 18, 1993, and
Jan. 31, 1994).
78 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500, 503.
79 Id. at 512.
8o Id. at 510-12. The "discretionary function" rationale adopted by the
Supreme Court replaced the rationale used by many lower courts that the defense
was based on the Feres-Stencel doctrine, which prohibits servicemen or government
contractor defendants from recovering tort damages from the United States gov-
ernment. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 984-92.
s See, e.g., Monks v. General Elec. Co., 919 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1990); Skyline
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The government contractor defense has become a
broadly applied shield of immunity, applicable to all liabil-
ity of a military contractor for injury caused by a design
defect.82 The Boyle decision did not limit the defense to
strict liability actions or any particular theory of recovery,
but instead referred to "liability" under "state law."81 3
The application of the broad sweep of the Boyle test can
be seen in the Fifth Circuit case of Smith v. Xerox Corp. 84
The Smith plaintiff was injured when an anti-tank weapon
simulator misfired. The Fifth Circuit summarized the
plaintiff's claims against the equipment manufacturer as
follows:
His allegations against [defendant] included negligence in
the design and/or manufacture of the weapon; strict liabil-
ity for injuries caused by a weapon unreasonably danger-
ous for its normal use; failure to warn or instruct [plaintiff]
regarding the possibility of the weapon's firing when
armed, when [defendant] had knowledge that the weapon
had malfunctioned in a similar manner previously; and
breach of warranty of fitness for intended use.8 5
After addressing each of the above causes of action indi-
vidually, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant
manufacturer was immune from liability on all of these
grounds based on the government contractor defense.86
Air Serv., Inc. v. G. L. Capps Co., 916 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1990); Maguire v.
Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1990); Kleemann v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953 (1990);
Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Xerox
Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Aircraft Crash Litigation, Frederick,
Maryland, May 6, 1981, 752 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Niemann v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. IIl. 1989).
82 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
3 Id.
84 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989).
:5 Id. at 136.
6 Id. at 137-40; see also Ganer v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that failure to warn claims are precluded by Boyle); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d
403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988) (stating that the gov-
emnment contractor defense precludes recovery for negligence as well as strict lia-
bility); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574 n.24 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the government contractor defense applies equally to design defect and failure to
warn); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
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Ron Bowles was right. The payout on this bet was
huge.
III. THE BOYLE TEST IN ACTION
The government contractor defense consists of three
independent elements that the manufacturer must prove
in order to avoid liability under state law. The first ele-
ment requires proof that the United States approved rea-
sonably precise specifications for the product in question.
After clearing that hurdle, the manufacturer must show
that the product conformed to those specifications. Fi-
nally, the contractor must prove that it warned the United
States about any dangers in the use of the product that
were known to the contractor but not to the United
States 87
Although it sounds simple enough, courts have grap-
pled with the application of the test to various allegations
and circumstances. To truly understand how the Boyle de-
fense works, one must analyze each of the three elements
of the government contractor defense independently.
A. REASONABLY PRECISE SPECIFICATIONS
The first leg of the Boyle test requires that the United
States government must have approved "reasonably pre-
cise" specifications for the design of the equipment at is-
sue.88 The case law regarding the proof that is required
to satisfy this particular element is well established. The
proof must show more than that the government merely
"rubber-stamped" the contractor's design. 9 This ele-
ment is satisfied, however, when there was much "back-
and-forth" discussion between the government and the
contractor, and the United States provided general speci-
464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (holding that military contractor defense eliminates all lia-
bility under § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts).
87 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
88 Id.
8- See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 935 (1989).
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fications and approved various stages of development.9"
In the Fourth Circuit Boyle opinion, the Court held that
Sikorsky had adequately demonstrated Navy approval of
reasonably precise specifications for the CH-53D: Sikor-
sky and the Navy worked together to prepare detail speci-
fications; Sikorsky and the Navy engaged in back-and-
forth discussions; Sikorsky built a mock-up of the helicop-
ter; and the Navy reviewed the mock-up and approved the
design. 9' Numerous federal courts have cited this factual
analysis with approval when discussing the requirements
necessary for a military contractor to prove the first leg of
the Boyle defense.92 For example, the Fifth Circuit used a
similar factual analysis in Skyline Air Service, Inc. v. G. L.
Capps Co. 93 when upholding a summary judgment for a he-
licopter manufacturer on the grounds of the government
contractor defense. In discussing the proof provided by
Bell Helicopter, the defendant in Skyline, the court stated
that the affidavit testimony provided by Bell showed that
"Bell was required to 'strictly adhere to previously estab-
lished, Government-approved specifications'; to follow
government specified procedures to assure compliance
with those specifications; and to design and manufacture
the helicopter precisely in accordance with the specifica-
tions - '[n]o deviations to the specifications or drawings
were permitted without Government approval.' "94
The government's continued use of the product in
question also establishes approval, particularly after the
government is made aware of any alleged defect.95 For
90 See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989); Kleemann
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 701-04 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 953 (1990); Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 942 (1990).
91 Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414-15.
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox, 866 F.2d at 138.
93 916 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 978. Skyline is significant in that the aircraft in question was a military
surplus helicopter owned and operated by a civilian company. The Fifth Circuit
found the Boyle defense applicable, nonetheless. Id. at 980.
91 See Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946, 950 (4th Cir. 1986);
Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., No. 88-Cl120, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8357
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1992).
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example, the Fourth Circuit in Dowd v. Textron, Inc. 96 held
that "[t]he length and breadth of the army's experience
with the [product] - and its decision to continue using it
- amply establish governmental approval of the alleged
design defects. ' 97 In summary, the first leg of Boyle looks
to government discretion, involvement, awareness, and
control.
B. PRODUCT CONFORMS TO SPECIFICATIONS
The second requirement of the Boyle test is that the
product in question must have conformed to specifica-
tions provided by the United States government. 98 The
government's acceptance of the product has been held to
satisfy this step of the Boyle test unless there is a showing
that the product was defectively manufactured. 99 When a
government-approved design has been reduced to de-
tailed design drawings and the drawings themselves have
been reviewed and approved by the government, compli-
ance with the specifications contained in those drawings
can also establish the second prong of the government
contractor defense. 0 0 A product conforms to reasonably
precise specifications if it satisfies an intended configura-
tion even if it may produce unintended and unwanted
results. 'o'
In an opinion dedicated primarily to defining the sec-
ond step of the Boyle test, the Fourth Circuit in Kleeman v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. 102 noted that much of the evidence
of government involvement required as proof for the first
leg of the Boyle test is also relevant to the second leg,
showing conformity with government specifications.' In
summarizing this viewpoint, the Fourth Circuit stated:
9 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986).
97 Id.
98 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
Harduvel, 878 F.2d at 1321.
oo Kleemann, 890 F.2d at 698.
lo, Id. at 703.
102 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989).
103 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 698.
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It is this salient fact of governmental participation in the
various stages of the aircraft's development that estab-
lishes the military contractor defense. Indeed, active gov-
ernmental oversight is relevant to all three elements of
defendant's burden. Where, as here, the Navy was inti-
mately involved at various stages of the design and devel-
opment process, the required government approval of the
alleged design defect is more likely to be made out. Simi-
larly, the Navy's extensive participation, including reserva-
tion of the power to approve or disapprove design
modifications, enhances the likelihood of final product
conformity .... [E]xtensive governmental participation
provides tangible evidence of the strong federal interest
which justifies the creation of a federal common law de-
fense for government contractors in the first place. 0 4
Courts have been unwilling to second-guess the gov-
ernment's decision that a product conforms to contractual
specifications and design requirements. For example, in
Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. 10 5 the court held that
"[n]othing in the record suggests to us that the Navy
found the [product] not to conform to specifications. It is
not our province, of course, to make such a finding in the
Navy's behalf. We accordingly conclude that no issue ex-
ists as to the [product's] conformity to Navy specifica-
tions." 106 Where the government inspects and accepts
the aircraft as produced, the second prong of the govern-
ment contractor defense is satisfied.10 7
C. WARNINGS
The final element of the Boyle test requires that the con-
tractor warn the United States government about possible
dangers in the use of the product that are known to the
contractor but not to the government. 08 Stated from the
04 Id. at 701 (citation omitted).
105 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989).
106 Id. at 951 (citation omitted).
107 Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (S.D. Ill.
1989).
1- Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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perspective of a plaintiff's proof, this leg of the Boyle test
can be broken down into three separate elements. First,
the contractor must have had knowledge of some danger
resulting from use of the product. Second, the danger
must be one that the government did not know about. Fi-
nally, the contractor must have failed to warn the govern-
ment about this possible danger. 10 9
These three elements comprising the third leg of the
Boyle test are a significant departure from the government
contractor defense enunciated by some courts prior to the
Boyle test's adoption by the United States Supreme
Court." O To the plaintiff's bar, the third leg is nothing
short of "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil," and has
been roundly criticized as an unnecessary departure from
traditional tort law."' In adopting the third leg of the
Boyle test, the United States Supreme Court clearly in-
tended to lessen the burden of proof placed on govern-
ment contractors to issue warnings to the United States
government."12 In justifying this change, the Supreme
Court said that "it does not seem to us sound policy to
penalize, and thus deter, active contractor participation in
the design process, placing the contractor at risk unless it
identifies all design defects." '" 3
The language of the Boyle case indicates that this third
element requires actual knowledge of the danger by the
contractor.' "4 Indeed, several courts have emphasized
-o9 Id. at 511; Harduvel, 878 F.2d at 1321.
110 See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11 th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988) (requiring contractor to inform military of design
alternatives "reasonably known" to the contractor).
'i See 3 KREINDLER, supra note 6, §§ 31-32 (1993). "In essence, this presump-
tion improperly shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer
failed to warn." Id.
12 The plain reading of the Boyle decision is clearly contrary to the assertion of
one author that "the Boyle decision does not relieve the manufacturer of its liabil-
ity and negligence for failing to point out a danger of which it should have been
aware in the exercise of reasonable care." I KREINDLER, supra note 2, at 7-94.
'11 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513.
114 Id.
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that it is actual knowledge that is required."l 5 This actual
knowledge requirement is inconsistent with speculation
that there may be some continued duty to warn under
Boyle. 1 16
The Fourth Circuit has held that where there is evi-
dence of pervasive government involvement in the pro-
curement and design process, the third element of the
Boyle test is more likely to be established." 7 Government
acceptance tests have been held as probative of the gov-
ernment's knowledge of a product's dangers. The length
of time a product is used by the government also shows
government knowledge of any dangers inherent in a
product." 8
IV. THE FIRST WAVE
The Boyle defense is a relatively new affirmative defense
which enjoyed tremendous success in the years immedi-
ately following its adoption. Government contractors,
however, have always been fat targets in products liability
litigation and the creative and energetic plaintiff's bar
wasted little time in trying to find a breach in the Boyle
defense. We are today nearing the end of the first wave of
this assault.
In many ways, litigation is war. The courtroom is the
battlefield and the attorneys are the generals. In the field
of aviation litigation, the government contractor defense
stands as a powerful citadel protecting the assets of manu-
facturers. Many zealous and talented litigation generals
have attempted to breach the walls of this citadel. What
115 See, e.g., Harduvel, 878 F.2d at 1321; Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1487; Niemann, 721
F. Supp. at 1028.
11,6 "Neither is there anything in the Boyle decision which requires insulating the
contractor from his continuing duty to warn of design defects." 1 KREINDLER, supra
note 2, at 7-94.
17 Kleemann, 890 F.2d at 701.
118 Zinck v. ITT Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1331, 1337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also
Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 89-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
3041 (1993) (Boyle's third element proved by government's superior knowledge of
product after several years of use).
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follows is a discussion of their strategies and the opposi-
tion's response.
A. THE DIRECT ASSAULT
The frontal assault should always be considered. The
defendant digs in and throws up his earth works and
barbed wire. This battlefield analogy is fitting, as any
plaintiff's attorney who has dealt with lawsuits against
government contractors knows. The success or failure of
an entire lawsuit will eventually hinge on breaching the
three-part Boyle test. The plaintiff is forced to take the lit-
eral reading of the Boyle test and defeat at least one leg of
the government contractor defense or retreat.
1. Precise Specifications
The first step in the Boyle defense involves showing that
the United States approved reasonably precise specifica-
tions. 1 9 A literal attack on this leg of the Boyle defense
splits the phrase in two. The specifications must be both
"reasonably precise" and "approved" by the United
States government.
a. Not Specific Enough
A common allegation in post-Boyle litigation is that the
specifications proffered by the manufacturing defendant
are not specific or "reasonably precise" as required by the
Boyle test. 20 In response, government contractors typi-
cally produce the procurement contract of the product in
question, a general design specification, blueprints, and
perhaps some military design guides incorporated into
the product's design specifications. Plaintiffs will in turn
point to a narrow theory of liability in support of a claim
that the specifications produced by the defendant are very
general and broad. 12  For example, the plaintiff in the
19 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503.
120 See, e.g., Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331, 334 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
12, This argument may have gained considerable support from the recent Fifth
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Boyle case argued that the specifications for the CH-53D
Emergency Escape System were very general in nature
and did not specifically mandate the design complained of
by the plaintiff. 22
This argument can best be rebutted by looking to the
Fifth Circuit's handling of this issue in Smith v. Xerox. 123 In
that case the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the govern-
ment contractor defense only requires the government to
approve reasonably precise specifications, which is met
where the contractor incorporated government perform-
ance specifications into a design that the government sub-
sequently reviewed and approved. 24 The Xerox case
involved an injury to a U.S. Army soldier when an explo-
sive cartridge in a shoulder-mounted "VIPER" weapon
simulator exploded prematurely. The soldier brought
suit for his personal injuries against Xerox, the manufac-
turer of the weapon. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for Xerox based on the government contractor
defense. 125 In discussing the evidence presented by
Xerox in support of its motion for summary judgment,
the court stated the following:
Although Xerox failed to produce complete specifications
for the original VIPERS it manufactured, Xerox did pro-
duce a listing of those specifications, as well as a copy of
the original government performance criteria dictating the
environmental specifications the government wanted the
VIPER to meet in terms of temperature, humidity and salt
resistance, and a production contract furnished by Xerox
for a series of VIPERS containing specific references to
government-approved specifications. Further, Lawrence
Gallagher, an employee of Xerox from approximately
Circuit decision in Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir.
1993). The Fifth Circuit notes that "silence in the specifications may leave room
for design discretion by the manufacturer, making possible the existence of a de-
sign defect in spite of conformity with the government specifications." Id. at 801.
122 Brief for Petitioner at 17, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988).
123 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989).
124 Id. at 138.
123 Id. at 139-41.
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1975 to 1983 who was involved with the development of
the VIPER system, testified at his deposition that the Army
reviewed and approved the drawings and specifications
prepared by Xerox. The government contractor defense
requires only that the government approve reasonably pre-
cise specifications. Because the government in this case
supplied the relevant environmental specifications it
wanted the VIPER to meet, which were incorporated into
Xerox's production contract, and Gallagher's unrebutted
deposition testimony was that the government reviewed
and approved Xerox's final drawings and specifications for
the VIPER, we find that Xerox has satisfied its burden of
proof on this issue. 126
b. Not Government-Approved
Another frequent attack on the first leg of the Boyle test
is to argue that the specifications offered by the defendant
are not government-approved. Many times the overall
product design guide is written by the manufacturer. Cer-
tain design features may be controlled by specifications
between the general contractor and a subcontractor.
Quite frequently these specifications for subcontracted
parts are not "approved" by government representatives
in the strictest sense.
No plaintiffs brief written in response to a defendant's
government contractor motion for summary judgment
should leave out a discussion of the most pro-plaintiff,
post-Boyle opinion issued by an appellate court, Trevino v.
General Dynamics Corp. '7 The Trevino case will forever pro-
vide plaintiffs some legal legitimacy for arguments that
have been clearly rejected by numerous other courts. The
Trevino case involved the death of five Navy divers aboard
a Navy submarine. The ventilation valve, which allowed
air to enter the flooded diving chamber, was not fully
opened. As the divers drained the water a vacuum formed
in the chamber.
126 Id. at 138.
127 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989).
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The Navy had contracted with General Dynamics to de-
sign the diving hanger in question. General Dynamics
was required to produce working drawings of the hanger,
review its work product to assure compliance with Navy
requirements, and inspect the final product before issuing
it to the Navy. The design work was done on-site at the
Mare Island Shipyard by General Dynamics employees.
Seventy-one pages of detailed working drawings were
submitted to the government for approval. Each of the
drawings was signed by a government employee in a box
marked "approved." Once the design work was com-
pleted, the Navy actually performed the manufacturing
work on the hanger.
Despite that evidence, the trial court found insufficient
proof of design approval by the military. 28 As a result,
the trial court found that the government contractor de-
fense did not apply and that General Dynamics was liable
for a defective design in the hanger.'2 9 In upholding the
trial court's decision, the Trevino Fifth Circuit panel noted
that the Supreme Court had adopted a discretionary func-
tion rationale for the Boyle test. 3 0 The Trevino panel then
went on to apply this discretionary function reasoning to
each element of the Boyle test rather than strictly following
the plain reading of the defense.' 3 ' The Trevino panel
proclaimed that "the government exercises its discretion
over the design when it actually chooses a design feature.
The government delegates the design discretion when it
buys a product designed by private manufacturer; when it
contracts for the design of the product or a feature of a
product, leaving the critical design decisions to the pri-
vate contractor; or when it contracts out the design of a
concept generated by the government .. .. " 132
128 Trevino v. General Dynamics Corporation, 876 F.2d 1154, 1155 (5th Cir.
1989). The court made this finding also despite "full awareness and acceptance of
design, defect and all, for thirteen years" by the government. Id. at 1155.
129 Id. at 1476.




The above interpretation of the government contractor
defense would certainly limit Boyle's application. The Tre-
vino case stands for the proposition that unless the gov-
ernment itself exercises discretion over a specific design
feature, the Boyle defense is not applicable. 3 ' Acknowl-
edging the feature, approving the feature, and even pub-
lishing government requirements that may make the
feature necessary would not satisfy the strict requirements
of the Trevino case. 34
The Trevino case is difficult to reconcile with any other
post-Boyle government contractor decision. In fact, Smith
v. Xerox, 35 issued on the same day as Trevino, formulates
an entirely different approach to the government contrac-
tor defense. The radical difference between Trevino and
other Fifth Circuit government contractor cases prompted
an attempt for a rehearing of Trevino en banc.'3 6 Although
the petition for rehearing en banc was denied, the dissent-
ing opinion written in opposition to this action provides
clear and compelling arguments for ignoring the Trevino
case.' 37 Notwithstanding recommendations to the con-
trary,13 8  the Trevino case has not been followed, unlike
Smith v. Xerox which is routinely cited for the status of the
government contractor defense in the Fifth Circuit.
2. Conformance
The second leg of the Boyle test requires a showing that
the product conforms to government specifications.' 39 As
13 Id.
134 The Trevino opinion borrows heavily from Lee Kreindler's interpretation of
the Boyle defense requirements. "It is very likely that a contractor may have a
difficult time meeting his burden of proof that a government official actually ap-
proved the specifications and drawings for the [interior] 'design feature in ques-
tion.' Rubber-stamping by the government will not constitute a sufficient defense
under Boyle." 1 KREINDLER, supra note 2, at 7-94. Lee Kreindler is recognized as
one of the most successful and prolific plaintiff's aviation litigators.
'35 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989).
136 Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 876 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1989).
17 Id. at 1155-57.
138 See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1016.
139 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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one might expect, plaintiffs have generally alleged that
the extent to which the government was involved in the
design and manufacture of the product simply did not suf-
fice to meet the requirements of this second leg. A more
interesting strategy question, however, involves the defi-
nition of the "specifications" involved. If the specifica-
tions involved are general in nature, conformance to such
specifications hardly seems to show the type of detailed
involvement in the process that is the basis of the govern-
ment contractor defense. Any recognition of conform-
ance on behalf of the government in such a case would be
nothing more than "rubber-stamping" the government's
design, such as in Trevino.140 On the other hand, specifica-
tions may be so extensive and detailed that no single gov-
ernment entity or officer could possibly have the requisite
knowledge or experience to know if the product truly con-
formed to these specifications.
In attempting to create a genuine issue of material fact
with regard to the second leg of the Boyle test, plaintiffs
typically pose the following questions: What are the
"specifications" involved? How do we know that any gov-
ernment official understands whether the product "con-
forms" to any specifications? Isn't this entire government
procurement process nothing more than a big rubber
stamp?
a. Pile on the Requirements
Rather than attacking the first leg of the Boyle defense
by arguing that the specifications governing the product
in question are general in nature, the plaintiff may focus
on the second prong of Boyle and recognize the reality of
the military product procurement system. Military pro-
curement officers will tell you that a procurement project
is not complete until the paperwork outweighs the prod-
uct itself. Unfortunately, this statement is literal in the in-
140 See infra text accompanying notes 147-50 for a discussion of "rubber-
stamping."
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stance of procurement of complex aircraft and machinery.
The procurement of an advanced weapon system involves
the generation of massive quantities of draft specifica-
tions, general specifications, preliminary specifications,
design drawings, performance specifications, materials
specifications, and numerous other specifications too spe-
cific to mention. A properly staffed and supported gov-
ernment contractor defense team will review and become
familiar with every specification provided to the opposing
side during discovery. The chore can sometimes be enor-
mous. In this regard, the plaintiff has the advantage.
The reality of the government procurement bureau-
cracy is that specifications for advanced systems are so
complex and so encompassing that the final product inevi-
tably deviates in many regards from beginning or inter-
mediate design criteria or specifications. These
deviations are generally documented at some stage in the
process and are by no means failures to conform in fact to
the requirements of the United States government. It is
infinitely easier, however, for plaintiffs to find the devia-
tions among the piles of specifications, design drawings,
and correspondences than for defendants to anticipate
this tactic and find the approval for the deviations.' 4 '
When the plaintiff's attorney becomes more familiar with
the regulations produced by the defense than his defense
counterpart, he becomes a truly dangerous adversary. 4 '
141 See, e.g., Landgraf v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 993 F.2d 558 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 553 (1993).
142 A related tactic involves quoting portions of the government's procurement
contract out of context and arguing that such clauses strip the government con-
tractor of his Boyle defense. See Wilson v. Boeing Co., 655 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa.
1987). The Wilson plaintiff, represented by the same attorney that represented the
Boyle plaintiffs, argued that a "Design Responsibility" clause in the procurement
contract absolved the United States government of any responsibility for the de-
sign of the product, thereby abrogating the defendant's government contractor
defense. The Wilson court stated that this "Design Responsibility" clause "cannot
be construed to abrogate the government contractor defense .... [S]uch a provi-
sion does not affect the applicability of the government contractor defense." Wil-
son, 655 F. Supp. at 773.
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b. DD 250 or Other Government Documents
Government contractors and government procurement
officers have their inevitable squabbles. The manufac-
turer produces a product for the client, the United States
government. When a single person of responsibility in
the massive government machine becomes dissatisfied
with a specific characteristic of the product, this displea-
sure can be reflected in several ways that may be inter-
preted as showing lack of conformance of the product to
specifications.
A Freedom of Information Act request 43 to various
proponents in the government procurement process may
produce correspondence discussing various shortfalls
with the product in question. If the correspondence dis-
cusses any defect attributable to the plaintiff's case, the
Boyle defense may be in trouble. The most damaging evi-
dence of the lack of conformity is a document showing the
withholding of government funds because the product
fails to meet government requirements. The final evi-
dence of government satisfaction with a product is a deliv-
ery document known as the DD 250.144 This is the
document to which both parties should look for evidence
of conformity.
The DD 250 is more than a simple bill of sale. This
document is the final evidence that the product conforms
in all respects to the expectations of the United States
government.' 45 The DD 250 is the last document on the
pile of government paperwork, and it sums up the entire
process by declaring that the specific product conforms in
all respects to the requirements of the United States
government.
143 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
144 Form DD 250, Nov. 1, 1968 [hereinafter DD 250] (copy on file with the Jour-
nal of Air Law and Commerce).
145 The form itself declares that "[a]cceptance of listed items has been made by
me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein
or on supporting documents .... Signature of auth. govt. rep." Id. What more
compelling evidence of conformance can there be?
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Although the DD 250 may be used as prima facie evi-
dence 46 of conformance by the defense, any withholding
of government funds listed on the DD 250 can be used to
great advantage by the plaintiff. The government con-
tracting officer may at times withhold a dollar amount
from the final payment on an otherwise accepted product
for a specific shortcoming in the product. Typically, the
manufacturer will correct the shortcoming or negotiate
the problem with the government. If the shortcoming in
question relates to the plaintiff's theory of liability, it is
critical that the defense produce documentation that the
disagreement with the contracting officer was resolved for
the equipment in question prior to the incident com-
plained of by the plaintiff.
c. Rubber-Stamping
The Trevino' 47 case coined the phrase "rubber-stamp"
to describe a situation in which government involvement
in a particular design is insufficient to constitute approval
of the design. 48 "The mere signature of a government
employee on the 'approval line' of a contractor's working
drawings, without more, does not establish the govern-
ment contractor defense." 149
Plaintiffs typically argue that any evidence provided by
defendant of written approval by government authorities,
such as signatures on design drawings or DD 250 accept-
ance documents, amounts to nothing more than "rubber-
stamping" by government bureaucrats who lack the requi-
site expertise to recognize whether the product actually
conforms to government specifications. Fortunately, the
Trevino case has largely been ignored by a large body of
federal law to the contrary, including numerous Fifth Cir-
146 Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, No. 92-1596GT(M), slip op. at 9 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 1993); Hendrix v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1551,
1556-57 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
"I' See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
148 Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1481.
149 Id. at 1480.
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cuit decisions since the Trevino case.' 50 A response to a
Trevino "rubber-stamping" argument should include cita-
tions to numerous post-Trevino cases with analogies to the
factual showings found sufficient to meet the require-
ments of the Boyle defense.
3. Warnings
The final leg of the Boyle defense requires a showing
that the supplier warned the United States about the dan-
gers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
supplier but not to the United States.' 5' This formulation
of the warning stage of the Boyle test makes a failure to
warn case practically impossible. 52 In fact, it would seem
that nothing short of deliberate fraud on behalf of the
government contractor would be sufficient to defeat the
Boyle test on a failure-to-warn case.
One of the few feasible and effective methods to attack
the third leg of the Boyle test is to produce a "deep throat"
with sufficient credentials to accuse the defendant of such
fraudulent conduct. The employment of retired or fired
government contractor employees as expert witnesses on
behalf of plaintiffs is becoming more commonplace in
government contractor litigation. The plaintiff's goal will
be to find someone "in the know," for example a former
accident investigator or design engineer, who would be
willing to testify to his former employer's knowledge of a
dangerous aspect of the product and the employer's ef-
forts to suppress the information about which the govern-
ment should have been informed. 53
15 See, e.g., Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 584 (1991); Skyline Air Serv., Inc. v. G.L. Capps Co., 916 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.
1990).
15, Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; see Hendrix, 624 F. Supp. at 1557.
152 Even members of the plaintiffs' bar seem resigned to conceding the third
element of the Boyle defense. See Arthur H. Rosenberg, The Government Contractor
Defense, A Military Contractor's Best Friend, LPBAJ. 10, 11 (Summer 1991).
153 Whether such intrigue actually occurs outside of the fantasy of courtroom
theater is subject to debate. The reality is that money talks.
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B. A LEGAL WAR OF ArrRITION
One theory that has recently emerged in various briefs
and articles asserts that the Boyle test is in fact a four-part
test. By placing an additional legal obstacle in front of
manufacturers, plaintiffs hope to wear down defendants'
Boyle defense efforts in a legal war of attrition.
Borrowing from the dicta used by the Boyle majority
when articulating the rationale for the government con-
tractor defense, plaintiff's attorneys claim that an identifi-
able significant conflict must exist between the
manufacturer's government contract and state law before
the Boyle three-part test is applicable. 54 Contrary to this
assertion, an additional legal analysis prior to reaching
the Boyle test is not a separate part of the government con-
tractor defense. The three-part Boyle test defines the nec-
essary scope of the displacement of state law. A
"discretionary function" or "significant conflict" analysis
in addition to the three-part test is not required. 155
In justifying the preemption of state law with a shield
from liability for government contractors, the Supreme
Court noted that the preemption doctrine was applied fre-
quently when the issues involved "uniquely federal inter-
ests." The Court holds that these uniquely federal
interests apply "to the civil liabilities arising out of the
performance of federal procurement contracts."' 156 After
reasoning that the existence of a significant conflict with
federal policy justifies the displacement of state tort law,
the Boyle Court defines the scope of this displacement (or
what must be shown in order to demonstrate a significant
conflict that justifies contractor immunity) as the Boyle
three-part test itself.157
Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal circuit has
1 4 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 152, at 10.
155 Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 3041 (1993); The Four-Part Boyle Test?, 3J & W FLYER, Apr. 1992, at 1.
IN Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506.
157 Id. at 512; see also Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1479 (stating "[t]he scope of the dis-
placement of state law is defined by the elements of the [Boyle] defense").
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held that an initial analysis of the significant conflict be-
tween state tort law and federal interest must be con-
ducted before reaching the Boyle test. It is the Boyle test
itself which defines a significant conflict between federal
law and state-imposed tort liability.
Plaintiffs' attorneys have also suggested that the Court's
language in Boyle narrowly restricts the application of the
Boyle defense to very specific cases of conflicts between
state tort law and federal interest.1 8 Such a suggestion is
contrary to numerous recent decisions affirming motions
for summary judgment in favor of government contrac-
tors of military equipment.' 5 9 These and other recent
cases show that federal courts now grant summary judg-
ment on the basis of the government contractor defense
as a matter of course.
An example of the broad scope of the government con-
tractor defense is the Fifth Circuit opinion in Stout v. Borg-
Warner Corp. 160 The plaintiff was an air-conditioning re-
pair technician who was injured while attempting to repair
an air-conditioning unit purchased by the United States
Army.'' The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the air-
conditioning unit on the basis of defective design and fail-
ure to warn. Specifically, the plaintiff in Stout contended
that safety devices that could have prevented his injuries
were neither provided for nor prohibited by the military
specifications. Rejecting this contention, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for the manufacturer because
the evidence established that the air-conditioning unit
conformed to military specifications. 62
Despite plaintiffs' attorneys' wishful annunciations to
158 David J. Stout, The Government Contractor Defense, Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 20049
(May 10, 1994); Rosenberg, supra note 152, at 11-12.
159 See, e.g., Skyline Air Serv., Inc. v. G.L. Capps Co., 916 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.
1990); Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1990); Monks v.
General Elec. Co., 919 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1990); Kleemann v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989); Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874
F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989).
160 933 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1991).
161 Id. at 332.
1-2 Id. at 333-34, 337.
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the contrary, 163 six years after the Boyle decision the gov-
ernment contractor defense is now broadly applied by
federal courts and readily available to government con-
tractors at the summary judgment stage.' 64 Plaintiffs may
continue to try to find a loophole in this bar to recovery,
but the argument that the Boyle test requires a fourth ele-
ment 165 has not yet found favor in federal courts.
C. DIVIDE AND CONQUER
When faced with a coalition of allied enemies, military
strategists recommend focusing on the weakest of oppo-
nents. By focusing on the lowest common denominator
of the product in question, this same strategy can be em-
ployed by plaintiffs in government contractor defense liti-
gation. Plaintiffs generally pursue as a "primary target"
the general or prime contractor. 66 In light of the govern-
ment contractor defense, a strong argument can be made
that the exact opposite approach should be taken. Gen-
eral contractors have the most direct contact with the
United States government and deal with government rep-
resentatives on a day-to-day basis. 67 General contractors
use subcontractors who can produce specialty parts that
the general contractor may not be in a position to pro-
163 See, e.g., 1 KREINDLER, supra note 2. "Properly construed, the defense is a
narrow one; it applies only in design defect cases and only when there is proof
that the government considered the 'design feature in question' and the contrac-
tor complied with the contract specifications." Id. at 7-96. "[F]ederal courts
themselves can no longer cavalierly determine the merits of the defense on sum-
mary judgment motions. Instead, the manufacturer must prove his defense before
a jury. Thankfully for plaintiffs, the Boyle decision indicates that this burden will
not be easily satisfied." Id. at 7-92. "[Plerhaps the greatest advantage of all, is
that all these considerations must be determined by the jury. The contractor has
the burden of proving the elements of his defense to a jury." Id. at 7-95.
164 See supra note 159.
15 See Lewis, 985 F.2d at 86-87.
166 For example, airplane manufacturers such as General Dynamics, Sikorsky,
Bell Helicopter, etc., as opposed to smaller subcontractors making specific com-
ponents such as Simmonds Precision Motion Controls, Hartzell Propellers,
Duncan Electronics, et al.
167 In fact, larger contractors such as Sikorsky and General Dynamics have large
contingents of government engineers and contracting agents physically officed in
the contractor's plant.
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duce. In fact, the more politicized weapons systems draw
heavily on subcontractors for the production of major
components.168 Often a subcontractor's involvement with
the government procurement process is indirect at best.
In fact, some smaller components originate from subcon-
tractors to subcontractors, making the smaller subcon-
tractors even farther removed from the process. 69 In
addition, many subcontracted components are actually
"off-the-shelf" parts common to ordinary, non-govern-
ment applications. Given the fact that many subcontrac-
tors are well-insured, prosperous corporations, there
seems to be little reason to directly challenge the general
contractor on government contractor issues. A better
course of action is to pursue the subcontractor, a defend-
ant ill-equipped to show government involvement with
the design and manufacture of the smaller
subcomponent.
A response to such a tactic is that the "Boyle test ...
requires that the government approve the reasonably pre-
cise specifications for the aircraft, and not... for each indi-
vidual component of the aircraft."' 7 In other words,
proof that the major component itself met government
specifications and was accepted by the military should be
sufficient to piggy-back all the components made by
- This is particularly true of subcontractors located in the congressional dis-
tricts of influential politicians.
169 For example, a general contractor may order an airplane's landing gear sys-
tem from a subcontractor. The subcontractor may in turn order the landing
gear's extension mechanism from a second company. This second generation
subcontractor may order a servo mechanism in the extension component from a
third subcontractor. The manufacturer of the servo may in turn order electronic
sensing devices from a fourth subcontractor. If the electronic sensing device was
the failed component in an accident, the theory of attacking the smallest common
denominator would dictate pursuing the subcontractor closest to the product in
question. There is very little chance that this fourth or fifth generation subcon-
tractor will have had any involvement with the government procurement process.
The component may be an off-the-shelf product utilized in non-military applica-
tions. If the subcontractor is the sole defendant, the Boyle defense may become a
side issue in litigation, giving way to traditional products liability issues.
170 Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (S.D. Ill.
1989) (court's emphasis); see also Wilson v. Boeing Co., 655 F. Supp. 766, 773
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1990).
BOYLE UNDER SEIGE
subcontractors. 171
D. A DEFECT BY ANY OTHER NAME - MANUFACTURING
DEFECT
By its very terms, the Boyle defense does not apply to
some manufacturing defects. If a product is manufac-
tured defectively, how can it be argued that the product
"conforms" to the manufacturing specifications? 172 Not
unexpectedly, plaintiffs typically attempt to categorize any
defect producing an injury in a government contractor de-
fense case as a defect in manufacturing. 173 For example,
in Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc. 174 the Fifth Circuit
held that voids found in mortar casings were manufactur-
ing defects rather than design defects. Deciding that such
defects were a result of the manufacturing process, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the government contractor
defense did not apply. 175
The most thorough discussion of the factors used to de-
termine if a defect is a manufacturing defect can be found
in Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp. 176 Harduvel, the sub-
ject of a 1992 made-for-television movie, involved allega-
tions that wire-chafing in a F-16 caused the aircraft to
become uncontrollable and to crash. 177 The Harduvel
plaintiff claimed that such wire-chafing was a manufactur-
ing defect and, therefore, the government contractor de-
fense did not apply. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
holding that a manufacturing defect consists only of "ab-
errational defects and not those that occur throughout an
17, Barring, of course, specific notification by the military that a component of
the equipment failed to conform to specifications or requirements.
172 Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11 th Cir. 1989).
173 See, e.g., Skyline Air Serv., Inc. v. G.L. Capps Co., 916 F.2d 977, 980 (5th Cir.
1990). Merely alleging that a supposed defect is a "manufacturing" defect is in-
sufficient to defeat the government contractor defense immunity. Id.
174 913 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1990).
75 Id. at 246. The Mitchell defendant argued, unsuccessfully, that the Boyle test
was applicable to the manufacturing process that allowed such defects to occur.
Id. at 245.
176 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989).
177 Id. at 1314-15.
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entire line of products."'' 7 8 The Eleventh Circuit noted
that an unintended or unwanted result was not a manufac-
turing defect so long as the end configuration was in-
tended. 79 More importantly, the Harduvel decision stands
for the proposition that while a jury may determine if a
defect exists, it is federal law that determines if a specific
defect is considered one of manufacture or design.18 0
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Bailey v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 18 suggests that discussions of "manufacturing"
defects versus "design" defects are irrelevant under the
Boyle defense. The Fifth Circuit had previously held that
"military contractor immunity does not apply in cases of
defective manufacture."'18 2 This broad statement creates
problems when one considers that
it is possible to have an allegedly defective feature about
which the government specifications are silent. For exam-
ple, if the government specifications regarding the [prod-
uct] did not specify the type or quality of metal to be used,
a metallurgic defect in the [product] would not be incon-
sistent with the finding that the [product] conformed to
specifications. 18 3
The Bailey opinion attempts to clear up the confusion
by explaining that the "seeming inconsistencies stem
from the use of the term 'manufacturing defect,' instead
of nonconformity with government specifications, and the term
'design defect,' instead of a defect in the government specifica-
tions." 184 The court explains that, although there will
usually be no significant difference between the above
terms and their intended meanings, such will not always
be the case. For example:
a manufacturing defect is not necessarily equivalent to
non-conformity with government specifications, because
18 Id. at 1317.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1316.
18, 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1993).
182 McGonigal v. Gearheart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1988).
813 Bailey, 989 F.2d at 799.
I84 d. at 801 (emphasis added).
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those specifications may be silent about some features,
making possible the existence of a manufacturing defect
in spite of conformity with the specifications. Likewise,
such silence in the specifications may leave room for de-
sign discretion by the manufacturer, making possible the
existence of a design defect in spite of conformity with the
government specifications.18 5
The Bailey court builds on the Harduvel opinion by not-
ing that whether the Boyle defense applies cannot be de-
termined by whether a specific label of manufacturing or
design defect is attached to the claim. The Fifth Circuit
goes one step further, however, by announcing that "ad-
herence to the three Boyle conditions specifically tailored
for the purpose will ensure that the defense is limited to
appropriate claims. In evaluating an assertion of the de-
fense, therefore, the state law label on the claims sought
to be dismissed is irrelevant.' 8 6 The Bailey court con-
cludes by stating that the "government contractor defense
does not necessarily apply only to claims labeled 'design
defect.' Whether it will apply to a particular claim de-
pends only upon whether Boyle's three conditions are met
with respect to the particular product feature upon which the
claim is based."'187 This conclusion is made despite the
dicta found in the Supreme Court's opinion prefacing the
three-part Boyle test that "[1]iability for design defects in mili-
tary equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law,
when" the three-part Boyle test is met. 88 Nonetheless, at
least in the Fifth Circuit, distinctions between manufactur-
ing and design defects no longer have any application in
government contractor defense cases.
V. SHORING UP THE DEFENSES
In light of recent increased activity in government con-
tractor litigation, all manufacturers of government-pro-
185 Id.
186 Id.
117 Id. at 801-02 (emphasis added).
188 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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cured equipment would do well to spend the time and
effort needed to protect themselves from unnecessary liti-
gation. The following are a few simple recommendations
that may assist a government contractor in retaining Boyle
immunity well into the future. '89
A. TAKE THE SURE WINNERS UP
To date, manufacturing defendants have been fairly
successful in defending the legal framework of the Boyle
defense on appeal. Common business sense dictates that
an evaluation of every case be made before attempting the
appeal process. If a plaintiff has succeeded in breaching
the Boyle defense at the trial level, dangerous collateral es-
toppel exposure may be present.
Every military product is arguably inherently danger-
ous. Decisions are made by designers and military pro-
curement officials who make trade-offs between the
system's safety and its combat effectiveness, thus, the ra-
tionale behind the Boyle defense. Manufacturers often
face the formidable task of defending a tort suit involving
emotional damage facts against a talented plaintiff's coun-
sel in his own backyard venue. If this hostile environment
produces factual findings defeating the Boyle defense, the
manufacturer's burden on appeal changes from a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard to a "no reason-
able jury" standard. If it appears that the plaintiff may
successfully breach the Boyle defense with regard to a spe-
cific product, the defendant should seriously consider set-
tling the case in order to avoid future collateral estoppel
consequences. 190
189 It is common knowledge that military hardware designed several decades
ago to be used for only a few years continues to be pressed into service today. It
is not uncommon today for pilots to fly aircraft that were built before the pilots
were born. The Boyle case itself involved a helicopter designed in the 1950s and
manufactured in the 1960s that crashed in the 1980s. The aircraft was built to
support the Vietnam war effort and was intended for a service life of only a dec-
ade. Planning for future litigation could pay tremendous dividends in the long
run for any manufacturer that intends to continue as a viable and insurable com-
pany into the 21st century.
19 As an example, a plaintiff may find a venue and fact pattern that makes the
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B. PRE-LOAD THE CANNONS
Modern conventional wisdom allows that the best way
to keep the peace is to prepare for war. The Boyle defense
is an affirmative defense. The defense lawyer must be
provided with the proof required to meet all three legs of
the Boyle test. 19 1 Given the extended life of many military
aircraft in service today (far beyond that intended by the
original designers) and document retention programs in-
stituted by manufacturers, the compilation of evidence to
support the government contractor defense is often time-
consuming and sometimes too little too late. Prior plan-
ning by a manufacturer's in-house legal staff 92 could sig-
nificantly decrease the amount of effort expended at the
outset of every lawsuit and greatly increase the chances of
success as to the government contractor defense.
Every major product sold to the United States govern-
ment should have an accompanying government contrac-
tor defense package prepared and ready for use.19 3 This
package should contain all of the pertinent information
that defense counsel may need in drafting a motion for
summary judgment on the government contractor de-
fense with the exception of the final DD 250' 9 4 for the
Boyle case indefensible at the trial level. From a strictly business standpoint, it
makes sense to settle this case as opposed to allowing it to proceed to trial. There
is always the real possibility that a factual determination that the Boyle case does
not apply to a given product will be upheld on appeal. Such possibility could
spawn numerous lawsuits regarding the same product and severely damage the
manufacturer's ability to apply the government contractor defense successfully in
the future. For a summary discussion of the offensive use of collateral estoppel,
see JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 295-309 (1987).
19' See DavidJ. Adams & C. Kevin McCabe, Defending Manufacturers Under the Gov-
ernment Contractor Defense, presented at the Journal of Air Law & Commerce Air Law
Symposium 12-15 (Feb. 27, 1992) (summarizing the proof required by defense
counsel when establishing the Boyle defense).
-9 Or an outside legal specialist hired for the purpose.
193 Subcontractors who do not sell directly to the government should insist on
such a package from the prime contractor in advance of litigation.
- The DD 250 is such compelling evidence of conformance under the second
leg of the Boyle defense that it is recommended that a copy be maintained indefi-
nitely on every product sold under contract with the military. See supra notes 144-
46 and accompanying text.
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specific product in question. 95 These packages could be
put together with relative ease for new products.' 96 Some
195 For example, the package may contain the procurement contract, initial de-
sign specifications, master design drawings showing government approval, the fi-
nal design specifications, government evaluation reports, and a list of all
important government and manufacturing witnesses involved in various stages of
the process.
- The following checklist may provide helpful guidelines for manufacturers
when assembling government contractor defense packages for a specific product.
1) United States approved reasonably precise specifications.
Helpful Evidence -
o Proof of government oversight
o Specific government-required design specifications
o Government approval of any design or product selection
o Exchange of information between contractor and
government
o Government review of design drawings or blueprints
o Documents submitted to government for review
o Production of prototype for government testing
o Proof of government's right to suggest design changes
o Government engineers assigned to project development
o Independent government analysis of product or compo-
nent in question
o Proof of continuous "back-and-forth" communication be-
tween supplier and government
o Visits to supplier's facilities by government engineers and
inspectors
o Final review of product by government before purchase
o Any authority either granted contractually or actually ex-
ercised by government over design and manufacturing
o Government employees assigned as plant resident
representatives
o Signatures by government procurement officials
o Detail specifications
2) Equipment conformed to government specifications.
Helpful Evidence -
o Government testing of product and component parts
o Ultimate government acceptance of product or compo-
nent as designed
o Cooperation with government on any subsequent design
changes
o DD 250 or other acceptance documentation
3) Supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equip-
ment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
Helpful Evidence -
o Any evidence of government's knowledge of dangers re-
lated to product or component
o Communication between government and supplier re-
garding dangerous conditions
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research may be required for older products. Contractors
could make the packages ready for shipment to defense
counsel within days of the filing of a lawsuit involving the
product in question. 97 A motion for summary judgment
on Boyle grounds could be filed within weeks of an appear-
ance by a prepared Defendant. 9 8
C. BUILDING STRONGER FACTUAL BARRIERS
Contractors should consider the Boyle defense as early
as the bidding stage for government contracts. The man-
ufacturer should attempt to negotiate the Boyle language
into the final procurement contract. Many government
contracts make it clear that the government has accepted
a product upon the issuance of a DD 250. The contractor
could negotiate to make this portion of the contract spe-
cifically address the language of the Boyle test. Subcon-
tractors should negotiate some form of government
review or acceptance into contracts with general contrac-
tors. Subcontractors might also consider indemnity
agreements or contractual obligations to defend when-
ever government contractor defense issues are litigated.
Throughout the design and testing phase, the contrac-
tor should make every effort to secure and memorialize
government participation, input, and approval. Every
manufacturer should take pride in their successes with a
particular product, but even marketing material might in-
clude some reference to the cooperative effort of govern-
o Supplier's internal communications regarding safety of
product in question
o Evidence of public or industry awareness of safety
problems related to component
o Usage history by government
19, New disclosure requirements adopted for use in federal courts provide addi-
tional incentive for such immediate response to defense counsel. See Barbara K.
Salyers, New Federal Rules Take Effect, 5 J & W FLYER, April 1994, at 2; John S.
DeGroote, Northern District Adopts New Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, 4 J & W
FLYER, July 1993, at 3; John S. DeGroote, "Fast Track" Litigation in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, 3 J & W FLYER, Nov. 1992, at 2.
118 From a strategy standpoint, however, the defendant may want to wait until
the completion of substantial discovery in order to lock the plaintiff into a theory
of recovery easily defeated by the Boyle test.
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ment engineers, planners, and coordinators.' 99
VI. REINFORCEMENTS ON THE WAY?
The Boyle defense is unquestionably federal common
law, and, as such, has no statutory basis and, arguably, no
basis in the United States Constitution. As long as there
exists governmental immunity from tort lawsuits, either
under the Feres Doctrine or the Discretionary Function
Theory, the Boyle defense is also an absolute necessity to
national defense and is correctly reasoned law. There is
no justice in the proposition that a military contractor
should be held liable under state tort law for injuries in-
curred by the use of equipment that is designed under the
strict dictates of military planners and government pro-
curement officials for use in combat.2 °0
As federal common law, however, the Boyle defense will
199 By contrast, a prime contractor's recent claim that the purchase by the mili-
tary of a certain aircraft "marks the first time the [government] has purchased 'off-
the-shelf [aircraft]" found in promotional materials could be damaging evidence
in future government contractor defense litigation. Citation withheld.
200 This author takes issue with the conclusions reached by several other au-
thors when discussing the government contractor defense. For example, in a stu-
dent comment published two years ago in this journal, the following arguments
were raised as rationale for severely limiting the Boyle defense:
First, civilians lack protection provided to military personnel under
the Veteran's Benefit Act. This leaves an injured civilian without a
remedy if state tort law is displaced. Second, military personnel do
have reasonable expectations that their equipment will not fail due
to a design defect. Third, faulty products can cause several
problems, such as, (1) an increase in public criticism of the public
procurement process, (2) personnel's lack of faith in their weapons,
and even (3) risks to national security if a product fails in war due to
a design flaw. Fourth, the current defense does not deter either the
government or the contractor from producing poorly designed
products.... Imposing liability on the contractor for defective prod-
ucts would make the contractor's bids less competitive because it
would have to pay the higher costs of accidents and injuries caused
by that product. This would lead to improved designs.... Fifth, not
all decisions involving the design .of military equipment involve mili-
taryjudgments. Some performance requirements are completely in-
dependent of whether a product is to be used by the military or
civilians .... [Sixth,] the government lacks the technical ability to
actively oversee the development of many types of highly technical
products. Thus, it is arguable whether they truly exercise discretion
in selecting a design.
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be forever at the whim and mercy of the United States
Supreme Court. A radical change in the Court's make-up
that might lead to overturning the Boyle defense is not an-
Stewart, supra note 6, at 1013.
The above unsupported conclusions demonstrate a lack of understanding of the
Boyle decision and its practical application. First, to complain that civilians lack
protection provided to military personnel under the Veterans Benefit Act ignores
the fact that the same is true any time a civilian is precluded from recovery under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Second, while military personnel do expect that their equipment will not fail
due to a "design defect," this argument rings hollow when the upper echelon of
the military procurement activity either dictated, accepted, or is aware of the "de-
sign defect." Every branch of the armed services appoints a senior military officer
to oversee a vast and expansive procurement effort for each specific piece of mili-
tary equipment. In addition, it is common for branches of the military to modify
equipment continually once it is purchased. Many times these modifications are
made with little or no input from the original contractor. Unlike the individual
consumer of an automobile, the military is not "stuck" with what is later discov-
ered to be a defect.
Third, to suggest that state tort law could have any effect on the "public criti-
cism of the federal procurement process" or "personnel's lack of faith in their
weapons" or "risks to national security" involves a blind faith in products liability
law not supported in even the civilian world. Besides, military procurement of-
ficers simply do not care about the results of civilian products liability lawsuits.
Their concern, and rightfully so, is to field the most effective combat equipment in
the interest of the United States military.
Fourth, the idea that "liability on the contractor for defective products would
make contractor's bids less competitive" thereby creating safer products during
the bidding process also ignores the reality of the government procurement sys-
tem. The development of military hardware is performance-driven and always on
the leading edge of technology. The government puts out for bid specifications
on an aircraft that goes faster, flies farther, and provides more combat power than
anything previously thought possible.
Fifth, the argument that the Boyle defense should be limited to military equip-
ment again ignores the Federal Tort Claims Act. This is the theoretical founda-
tion for the entire Boyle defense. It is immaterial which government agency
dictates the design criteria, the Department of the Navy or the Department of the
Interior.
Finally, the argument that the Boyle defense should be limited because the gov-
ernment lacks the technical ability to oversee the development of the product
again demonstrates a lack of understanding for the procurement process. The
United States government is not an ignorant consumer buying a technical product
about which it has no understanding. For example, the United States government
has vast expertise in overhauling, updating, and operating the CH-53 helicopters
it operates around the world. After the initial procurement process, the contrac-
tor's exposure and experience with the product is quickly outstripped by the con-
sumer, the military. In summary, a plaintiffs attorney should not be allowed to
dictate to the United States military and its contractors the design of military
hardware. The extensive decision-making process of government and civilian en-
gineers should not be usurped by jurors.
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ticipated in the near future. The possibility remains, how-
ever, in the long run.
In addition, there is always the possibility that the
United States Congress may enact products liability legis-
lation that affects the Boyle defense. The latest trend in
this area, however, would suggest that the Boyle defense is
safe from any congressional tampering. Most product lia-
bility legislation introduced in the last ten years seeks to
expand the protection of manufacturers as opposed to
providing new avenues of recovery for tort victims.2"'
Most encouraging for manufacturers is the possibility
that the Boyle defense may be expanded to cover a larger
variety of products. To bolster its arguments on appeal,
Sikorsky was very careful in its briefings before the court
of appeals and the Supreme Court to refer to the defense
as a "military contractor defense. ' 20 2 The argument that
the Boyle test is available for military contractors designing
and building military equipment seems more palatable
than allowing the Boyle defense for any item procured by
the United States government. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Supreme Court opinion refers to the Boyle
defense as the "government contractor defense. '20 3
There is no indication from Judge Scalia's opinion that
the Boyle defense should be strictly limited to military
equipment. In fact, since Boyle, products that might other-
wise be considered non-military have enjoyed the immu-
nity of the Boyle defense.20 4 There appears to be no
reason why any equipment purchased by any entity of the
201 See, e.g., S. 67, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1458, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); see also Frederick P. Alimonti, New General Aviation Bill Has Broad Support,
AVIATION LITIG. NEWS, Dec. 1993, at 3, 25.
202 Brief for Respondent and Supplemental Brief for Respondent, Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500. Tele-
phone interview with Ron Bowles, supra note 34 (May 18, 1993).
203 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500.
204 See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993); Garner v. San-
toro, 865 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1989);Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding government contractor defense applicable to postal
service vehicles); In re Chateaugay Corp., 132 B.R. 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
But see Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogal Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.
1992); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992).
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United States government could not be covered by the
Boyle immunity if the three elements of the Boyle test are
shown.
Two additional expansions on the Boyle defense have
recently surfaced. A federal judge in California has
promulgated a "high-tech preemption doctrine" in a suit
stemming from a friendly fire incident during Operation
Desert Storm.20 5 The high-tech preemption doctrine ex-
tends the Boyle defense into the manufacturing defect
arena. The court concluded that "[t]he federal interest in
procuring sophisticated combat weaponry... is impinged
upon by state tort manufacturing defect suits ... This is
due primarily to the strong government interest in pro-
tecting against the disclosure of the design and capabili-
ties of such weaponry. "206 The California district court
ruled that any state product liability suit involving military
products that have no civilian counterpart must be dis-
missed as a matter of law based on this high-tech preemp-
tion doctrine. 0 7
The Court emphasized its point by stating that
"[e]xposing government contractors to tort liability, even
for manufacturing defects, would place undue pressure
on manufacturers to act too cautiously, even when the na-
tional interest would be better served by expedient pro-
duction rather than defect-free weapons. 2 0 8
Further strengthening that may come from courts in the
future includes additional opinions clearly holding that
the production of a DD 250 on a military product is prima
facie evidence that the government contractor defense has
been met and that attacks on the individual components
205 Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1489 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
206 Id. at 1490.
207 Id. at 1492. As an alternative ground, the court set forth a "combat preemp-
tion doctrine," which would preclude suits against the United States and contrac-
tors arising out of combat-related activities of the U.S. military. Id. The court
relied on the combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2860(j) (1988) and the Ninth Circuit opinion of Koohi v. United States,
976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992). Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1492.
2o8 Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1493.
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of the product are insufficient to derail proof that the
overall product itself met the Boyle test.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the Boyle defense may seem harsh in opera-
tion to those unfamiliar with the government procure-
ment system, the rationale articulated by Justice Scalia is
sound, correct, and pragmatic. As Justice Powell, who
was then sitting on the Eleventh Circuit, stated so
elegantly:
Young servicemen ... represent the very best of our Na-
tion's citizens. Americans take pride in their bravery and
skill, and mourn when their lives are tragically lost. The
pilots and crews of military aircraft willingly embrace the
risks that they assume by volunteering to serve our coun-
try. They are not the "military doubles of civilian motor-
ists," (citation omitted), or ordinary purchasers of
consumer products. The Supreme Court's adoption of
the government contractor defense recognizes that one of
these risks is the operation of the equipment in which
safety concerns have been balanced against cost and per-
formance. With respect to consumer goods, state tort law
may hold manufacturers liable where such a balance is
found unreasonable. In the sensitive area of federal mili-
tary procurement, however, the balance is not one for
state tort law to strike. Although the defense may some-
times seem harsh in its operation, it is a necessary conse-
quence of the incompatibility of modern products liability
law and the exigencies of national defense.2 °9
While Boyle may be under siege, the citadel walls are
stronger today than ever.
20 Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1322 (11 th Cir. 1989).
